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Introduction
In [17] , J. Outrata formulated first order necessary conditions for the following equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC):
(EPEC) min{f i (x i , z) : 0 ∈ F (x, z) + N U (z)} (i = 1, . . . , N ).
Here, the x i ∈ Ê n refer to decisions taken by N players (e.g., market competitors), whose objective functions f i do not only depend on their own decisions x i but also * This work was supported by the DFG Research Center Matheon Mathematics for key technologies in Berlin.
on some parameter z which might represent an exterior decision (e.g., in a leaderfollower system). All decisions together are linked by a generalized equation 0 ∈ F (x, z) + N U (z) which could model some equilibrium constraint or the solution of a parameter-dependent optimization problem. It is assumed that U is a closed convex set and N U refers to its normal cone. In principle, (EPEC) is nothing else but a coupled system of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPECs), where each single MPEC describes the optimization problem solved by the individual players given the decision of the other players. The vector (x 1 , . . . ,x N , z) is declared to be a solution to (EPEC), if for i = 1, . . . , N the vectors (x i , z) are solutions to the MPEC min{f i (y, z) : 0 ∈ F (x 1 , . . . ,x i−1 , y,x i+1xN , z) + N U (z)},
i.e., none of the players can improve his decision given the decisions of his competitors.
As pointed out in [17] , these MPECs are typically nonconvex even under convexity assumptions on the data f i , F , U . Therefore it makes sense to identify possible solutions by means of first order necessary conditions. In [17] , it was proposed to do so by using Mordukhovich's co-derivative D * of multifunctions (see [15] ) as a basic tool. For recent extensions of these ideas (e.g., to stability issues in the context of quasi-variational inequalities), we refer to [16] (see also [15] ). We cite the following Theorem from [17] , slightly adapted to the purposes of our paper: 
We shall adopt from [17] the name M (ordukhovich)-stationary point for any (x, z) satisfying (1) and (2) . The main difficulty in the verification of both the constraint qualification and the optimality conditions (1) and (2) is the computation of the coderivative D * N U to the normal cone mapping associated with U . Explicit formulae ready to use can be found in [2] and [18] for the cases of U being a nonnegative orthant or a rectangle. On the other hand, many practical applications like electricity spot market modeling lead to sets U which are general polyhedra. The purpose of this note is threefold: first, it is intended to apply the ideas presented so far to a simplified model of electricity markets under an independent system operator regime similar to [4] and [11] . Second, and subordinate to this aim, an explicit formula for D * N U is derived for general polyhedra U . Third, the whole problem is put into a stochastic framework which is of much interest due to uncertainties in electricity demands. For discrete distributions, a characterizing system of relations for identifying M -stationary solutions is provided and such solutions are explicitly calculated for a simple example.
Since electricity production and trading decisions of smaller power firms (followers) do not influence market prices, electricity portfolio optimization models for such firms may be developed without regarding their market interactions. Inputs of portfolio optimization models are stochastic price and demand processes in the relevant time horizon (see, e.g., [3] ). To extend stochastic portfolio optimization models to firms having market power (leaders), the use of modified market prices is suggested, e.g., in [1] .
To investigate the behavior of power firms in deregulated electricity markets, gametheoretic models are employed (see, e.g., [7] , [8] , [28] ). Such models have to incorporate the specific features of electricity markets, namely, the transmission network and the bidding of price-quantity pairs of each generator in the network. When modeling single-leader-follower games one arrives at mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPECs). Presently, theory and numerical methods for MPECs is well developed. We refer to the monographs [14] , [19] , [5] , the survey [12] and to [25] , [6] . Extensions to stochastic MPECs (SMPECs) can be found in [26] , [27] and applications to electricity markets are discussed, e.g., in [9] , [21] .
The modeling of multi-leader-follower games leads to coupled systems of MPECs or equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs). In recent years, much effort has been directed to the theory of such games [20] and to numerical methods [13] based on nonlinear programming and nonlinear complementarity (re)formulations. Furthermore, EPEC models for electricity markets with generators and customers located on a network have been developed and analyzed in [11] , [10] , [22] . A stochastic EPEC (SEPEC) modeling of an electricity market under demand uncertainty is studied in [4] .
A simplified model for competition in electricity spot markets
In the following, we consider a model for competition in electricity spot markets which is a version, simplified for the purpose of our analysis, of models presented in [4] and [11] . We assume that some electricity network is represented by an oriented graph, whose m edges correspond to transmission lines and whose N nodes refer to places at which a demand for electricity is observed and at which electricity is generated. Neglecting, for the sake of simplicity, transmission losses, the satisfaction of demand may be modeled as (3) q + By d.
Here, d ∈ Ê N refers to the vector of demands at each node, q ∈ Ê N is the vector of electricity generated at the same nodes and y ∈ Ê m represents the oriented flow vector of electricity along the edges of the graph. B is the incidence matrix of the electricity network. Typically, q and y are simply bounded by
where the inequality signs are to be understood component-wise. Generators bid a cost function to an independent system operator (ISO):
These may differ from the true cost functions
Throughout the paper, we shall assume that β i > 0 for i = 1, . . . , N , thus accepting the idea that cost functions are typically convex and leaving aside the purely linear case. More general cost functions were allowed in [4] . Here, we restrict ourselves to the quadratic case as considered in [11] . The ISO determines a vector of generated electricity satisfying the constraints above and minimizing the overall costs:
where
Note that, by convexity, an optimal solution q * of (4) is characterized as a solution to the generalized equation
Here, [diag β] denotes the diagonal matrix composed of diagonal entries β i . With q * being an optimal solution to (4), the clearing price charged by generator i amounts to the derivative of its bid cost function at q * i (see [11] ):
Thus, generator i's profit calculates as
Therefore, given some fixed bid coefficients (α j , β j ) of the remaining competitors j = i, generator i solves the following mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC):
(compare (5)). Since all competitors solve a similar MPEC given the decisions of the remaining ones, the coupled system of MPECs min αi,βi,q,y
forms an EPEC. This EPEC falls into the general class of type (EPEC) presented in the introduction. Indeed, in our specific model, one has to put x i := (α i , β i ), z := (q, y), U := G as well as
Specializing Theorem 1.1 from the introduction to our setting, we obtain: Theorem 2.1. Let (α, β,q, y) be a solution to (7) . If, for all i = 1, . . . , N , the multifunctions
are polyhedral or satisfy the constraint qualification
One observes that the difficult part both in the verification of the constraint qualification and in the application of the first order necessary condition consists in calculating the co-derivative D * N G . This is the aim of the following section.
On the co-derivative of the normal cone mapping to a polyhedron
This section is devoted to the derivation of an explicit formula for the co-derivative of the normal cone mapping to a polyhedron. Before addressing this topic, we recall the definition of the Mordukhovich normal cone (also called limiting normal cone) and the induced co-derivative (see [15] ):
n be an arbitrary set andx ∈ cl S. Then, the Mordukhovich normal cone to S atx is defined by
where [T S (x)] * refers to the negative polar of the contingent cone T S (x) to S at x (also known as the Fréchet normal cone) and 'Limsup' denotes the upper limit in the sense of Kuratowski-Painlevé convergence.
For a multifunction Φ : Ê n ⇉ Ê p , consider a point of its graph: (x, y) ∈ gph Φ. The Mordukhovich normal cone induces the following co-derivative
Now, we consider a polyhedron C := {x ∈ Ê n : Ax b}, where b ∈ Ê m and A is a matrix of order (m, n).
As C is convex, the Mordukhovich normal cone N C reduces to the normal cone in the sense of convex analysis here. In particular x 0 ∈ C and v 0 ∈ N C (x 0 ). With a i and b i referring to the rows of A and components of b, respectively, let
We introduce the following subset of I:
Finally, for each index subset I ′ ⊆ I, we introduce the closed cone (14)
as well as the characteristic index set
Proposition 3.2. With the notation introduced above, one has
Here, con and span refer to the convex conic and linear hull, respectively. P r o o f. First note that the set gph N C is no longer convex although the polyhedron C is. As a consequence, the Mordukhovich 
where the F i are the closed faces of the cone
and T C denotes the tangent cone to C in the sense of convex analysis. As in Definition 3.1, we use an asterisk for denoting the negative polar (or dual) cone. Combining the well-known representation
with (13) and the definition of the index set J, one immediately derives that
Now, any closed face of K 0 is given by a cone F I ′ as introduced in (14) and with I ′ being an arbitrary index set with J ⊆ I ′ ⊆ I. Clearly, the implication
holds true for all index sets I 1 , I 2 such that J ⊆ I 1 , I 2 ⊆ I. While the reverse implication cannot be derived in general, one may easily show the following for the same index sets:
In other words, there exists an index set I 3 , such that F I2 = F I3 ⊆ F I1 and I 1 ⊆ I 3 . Summarizing, any pair of index sets I 1 , I 2 with J ⊆ I 1 ⊆ I 2 ⊆ I induces a pair of closed faces of K 0 such that one is a subset of the other, and, conversely, any such pair of closed faces of K 0 can be represented by a pair of index sets I 1 , I 2 with
Consequently, we may rewrite (16) as
We claim that
where Q I1,I2 is defined in the statement of the proposition. Recall that, by the very definition of χ in (15) , one always has that I 2 ⊆ χ(I 2 ) ⊆ I. Now, given any h ∈ F I1 − F I2 , one has h = h 1 − h 2 for some h 1 ∈ F I1 and h 2 ∈ F I2 . The inclusion I 1 ⊆ I 2 along with (14) then implies that
By (15), we have that a i , h 2 = 0 for all i ∈ χ(I 2 ). Moreover, a i , h 1 0 for all i ∈ χ(I 2 ) \ I 1 . Altogether, this establishes the inclusion '⊆' of (18) .
For the reverse inclusion, let h ∈ Q I1,I2 be arbitrary. In the case of χ(I 2 ) = I, it follows from the definition of Q I1,I2 that h ∈ F I1 ⊆ F I1 − F I2 (due to 0 ∈ F I2 ). Hence, we may assume now that χ(I 2 )°I. By (15), we have
As a consequence, for all j ∈ I \ χ(I 2 ) there exists some h j ∈ F I2 such that a j , h j < 0. We put
Note that h * is well-defined by I \ χ(I 2 ) = ∅. Clearly, h * ∈ F I2 and
by the definition of h i and by a i , h j 0 for all j ∈ I \ χ(I 2 ) (recall that h j ∈ F I2 ). This allows to define t := max 0, max
Finally, puth := h + th * . Due to h ∈ Q I1,I2 and h * ∈ F I2 , we have
Consequently, recalling that I 1 ⊆ I 2 ⊆ χ(I 2 ), it follows that a i ,h = 0 for all i ∈ I 1 and a i ,h 0 for all i ∈ χ(I 2 ) \ I 1 . We claim that
Indeed, the inequality is obvious if a i , h 0, because of t 0 and a i , h * < 0. If a i , h > 0, then the same inequality follows from
by the definition of t. Summarizing the previous relations, one arrives ath ∈ F I1 . Therefore, h =h − th * ∈ F I1 − F I2 , where we used that th * ∈ F I2 due to t 0. This finishes the proof of (18). Evidently, P I1,I2 = Q * I1,I2 for P I1,I2 as defined in the statement of the proposition. Consequently, the proposition is proved upon referring to (18) and (17) . R e m a r k 3.3. If the vectors {a i : i ∈ I} happen to be linearly independent, then χ(I ′ ) = I ′ for all I ′ ⊆ I and the definitions of P I1,I2 and Q I1,I2 in Proposition 3.2 simplify accordingly.
Corollary 3.4. In the setting of Proposition 3.2, one has the following:
Here, I a (s) := {i ∈ I : a i , s = 0}, I b (s) := {i ∈ I : a i , s > 0}.
P r o o f. From the definition of the co-derivative and from Proposition 3.2, it follows that
is non-empty only if −s ∈ Q J,J which means, by definition, that a i , s = 0 for all i ∈ J and a i , s 0 for all i ∈ χ(J) \ J. This proves the second statement of the corollary. We show that (20) Q
Indeed, the definitions of the respective index sets yield that I 1 ⊆ I a (s) and
It follows that
one arrives at a i , h 0 for all i ∈ χ(I 2 ) \ I 1 , whence h ∈ Q I1,I2 . This establishes (20) . Recalling that P I1,I2 = Q * I1,I2 , it results from (20) that
Now, we may continue (19) as
which proves the first statement of the corollary.
The following simplification of Corollary 3.4 is possible under the assumption of linear independence:
Corollary 3.5. If the {a i : i ∈ I} are linearly independent, then Corollary 3.4 simplifies to
and
P r o o f. In view of Remark 3.3, we have that χ(J) = J and, by
Then, Corollary 3.4 yields the assertion of the proposition with the first identity replaced by an inclusion. To prove the reverse inclusion, let r ∈ con{a i : i ∈ I b (s)} + span{a i : i ∈ I a (s)} be arbitrary. Then, by the definition and due to (21), r ∈ P I a (s),I a (s)∪I b (s) . Exploiting (21) once more, the definitions of I a (s) and
This finishes the proof.
Another simplification of Corollary 3.4 can be obtained without linear independence, but under the assumption of strict complementarity (i.e., λ i > 0 for all i ∈ I in (13)):
The second case follows immediately from Corollary 3.4 and from J = I. Now, in the first case, one has a i , s = 0 for all i ∈ J, hence J ⊆ I a (s) ⊆ I.
Consequently, I
a (s) = I and I b (s) = ∅. Then,
by virtue of Corollary 3.4. For the reverse inclusion, let r ∈ span{a i : i ∈ I} be arbitrary. Observing that χ(I) = I, one has r ∈ P I,I and −s ∈ Q I,I . Therefore, r ∈ D * N C (x 0 , v 0 )(s) by the definition of D * N C and by Proposition 3.2.
Corollary 3.6 shows that the conic part in the representation of the co-derivative comes into play only if strict complementarity is violated. For later purpose, we give a slightly more handy formulation of Corollary 3.6.
Here, A I refers to the matrix whose row vectors are the a i for i ∈ I.
Application to the electricity market model
In this section, we illustrate the results of the previous section by applying them to special instances of the electricity market model. We consider the EPEC (7). For the simplicity of the presentation, we restrict our considerations to so-called interior solutions. By this we mean a solution (α, β,q, y) of (7) satisfying (22) α
Recall that (α, β,q, y) being a solution of (EPEC) implicitly entails that (q, y) ∈ G. The positivity of the bidding coefficients α i , β i is a very natural assumption. The remaining relations characterize a solution where no generator and no flow of electricity reaches its simple lower and upper bounds.
Verification of the constraint qualification
As one can see from the concrete shape of F in (8) , this mapping is bilinear in the couple (β, q) of variables. Thus, it fails to be polyhedral and, in order to apply the first order necessary conditions of Theorem 2.1, one first has to verify the constraint qualification of that same theorem.
Lemma 4.1. If the incidence matrix B of the electricity network has rank m (i.e., the network is acyclic), then any interior solution to (6) satisfies the constraint qualification of Theorem 2.1. P r o o f. We ignore the equation in (10) and observe that, using the partition v = (v a , v b ) , the inclusion in (10) may be written as
Now, (q, y) ∈ G implies thatq + By d. If any inequality in this system were strict, then one could strictly decrease the cost function c i (q i ) in (4). This is because α i , β i > 0 (see (22) ) and so c i is strictly increasing. Then, however, (q, y) could not be a solution of (4). Consequently,q + By = d and so I = {1, . . . , N } for the set of active indices defined in Section 3 (note that the other inequalities defining G are non-binding due to the assumption (22)). It follows that for some λ ∈ Ê N + , (5) may be transformed into
By (22), comparison of the first components yields that λ i > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Hence, J = I for the index set introduced below (13) . This allows to apply Corollary 3.7. We note that the matrix A I occurring in this corollary coincides in our concrete setting with the matrix −(I | B) describing the inequality systemq + By d which was actually shown to be active in each of its components. The minus-sign is due to the fact that the polyhedron C in Section 3 is described by means of ' '-inequalities. Applying now Corollary 3.7 to (23) one obtains the relations
for a certain multiplier vector µ ∈ Ê N . Combination of the two components in the second equation yields
Since β i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N according to (22) and B has rank m by assumption, it follows that the (m, m)-matrix B T [diag β]B has rank m too. Hence, v b = 0 and, referring to the first equation of (25), v a = 0, and so v = 0, as was to be shown.
We do not continue here to derive the first order necessary conditions from Theorem 2.1 because it turns out that these do not uniquely identify a stationary solution. Rather a continuum of such solutions is obtained. This is consistent with a corresponding observation in [11] related to simultaneous bidding of linear and quadratic cost coefficients. We shall rather follow the idea in [11] to consider partial bidding of, say, linear cost coefficients in order to identify solutions. Before doing so, we generalize our setting by allowing the demands d i in (3) to be random.
Formulation of a stochastic equilibrium problem under equilibrium constraints (SEPEC)
Since every player i ∈ {1, . . . , N } does not know the demands d j at least for j = i, but hopefully has access to historical data, it is natural to assume that d is a random vector on some probability space (Ω, F , È) whose probability distribution is known (approximately). This assumption leads to a polyhedral-valued multifunction G defined on Ω with values in Ê N +m given by
Hence, the pair (q, y) of generation and flow has to be considered as a Ê N +m -valued random vector on (Ω, F , È) and the ISO has to minimize the expected overall costs, i.e., (26) min
Furthermore, the EPEC (7) now becomes the following stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC)
where the pairs (α i , β i ), i = 1, . . . , N , are deterministic and have to be determined before the realization of the demand, and the pairs (q i (·), y i (·)), i = 1, . . . , N , are stochastic. In the terminology of two-stage stochastic programming with recourse, the cost coefficients (α i , β i ) are first-stage decisions, while (q i (·), y i (·)) are secondstage or recourse decisions.
Notice that the stochastic EPEC (27) there exists a measurable function (q(·), y(·)) : Ω → Ê N +m such that (q(ω), y(ω)) ∈ G(ω), È-a.s. The expectations exist since q is bounded byq.
The stochastic EPEC (27) corresponds to a coupled system of (specific) stochastic MPECs. Theoretical aspects of stochastic MPECs and their solution by sampling methods are studied in [26] , [27] . Existence and stability results for solutions and numerical methods for stochastic EPECs are widely open. We shall suppose in the following section that the underlying probability distribution of random demands is discrete as a consequence of approximating some continuous distribution. This is common practice in stochastic optimization in order to make the resulting problems amenable to solution methods of linear and nonlinear programming. Moreover, in our problem, discretization allows to get back to an (enlarged) deterministic (EPEC) of the same type as considered before. Therefore, the methodology developed for EPECs applies at the same time to discretized SEPECs.
4.3. Identification of M -stationary solutions for discrete random demands and partial bidding of linear coefficients.
Assume that the probability distribution of d is discrete with finite support and denote by d (1) , . . . , d
The scenarios induce K different polyhedra of scenario-dependent generation and transmission constraints
According to the remarks at the end of Section 4.1, we suppose now the quadratic bid coefficients to be known, hence, β = δ, and only the linear bid coefficients to be the subject of optimization. The generalized equation (5) now has to be established for each scenario k as follows:
Accordingly, generator i's profit under scenario k equals
where q (k) * is a solution of (28) . Then, in order that every generator maximizes its expected profit, the underlying SEPEC becomes
where q = (q (1) , . . . , q (K) ), y = (y (1) , . . . , y (K) ) and
Here, the p k are the probabilities for the demand scenarios d (k) , so in particular they fulfill the relations
In order to apply Theorem 2.1, we rewrite (SEPEC) as a usual EPEC. To this aim we put
Owing to the calculus rule
(SEPEC) boils down to (EPEC) as presented in Section 2. Since F is a linear mapping, the multifunction (9) is polyhedral and we may directly apply the necessary optimality conditions of Theorem 2.1 without checking the constraint qualification.
As in Section 4.1, we shall be interested in so-called interior solutions for the ease of presentations. Owing to the scenario character of parts of the solution, we have to make this concept more precise: A solution (α,q, y) of (7) with the data specified above is called an interior solution if it satisfies (29)
Recalling that partial derivatives just with respect to α i rather than with respect to (α i , β i ) have to be considered now, we deal with
where e i denotes the ith standard unit vector in Ê N . Then, writing the ith multiplier in the necessary optimality conditions as
, the first equation (11) becomes
Next, repeating (scenario-wise) the same argumentation as the one leading to (24) , and taking into account that β = δ, one verifies the existence of λ
This may be condensed into the relations
When describing the polyhedron G introduced above as an inequality system of the type Ax b as required in Section 3, one would have to put
On the other hand, looking for interior solutions according to (29), only the inequalities of the type q (k) + By 
and the matrix A I introduced in Corollary 3.7 has the shape
Then, with the partition v
m , Corollary 3.7 allows to extract the following two conditions from the inclusion (12):
Moreover,
Thus, Corollary 3.7 together with the inclusion (12) yields the existence of multipliers µ
Here, v 
Summarizing, M -stationary solutions of (SEPEC) are characterized by the relations (30), (31), (32), (33) and (34).
Explicit calculation of M -stationary solutions for a small example
Finally, we want to illustrate the results of the previous section by explicitly calculating the solution of (SEPEC) for the smallest meaningful example, namely a network consisting of N = 2 nodes which are linked by one single arc (m = 1). In this case, the incidence matrix simply becomes
First, (30) may be shortly written as Summing up all these equations upon multiplying them by the probabilities p k , one arrives at (37) α 1 + 2δ 1 q 1 = α 2 + 2δ 2 q 2 .
Next, we derive from (34) the equations
(k = 1, . . . , K).
Summing up over k the upper equations, we get
12 .
Taking into account (35), this reduces to
Furthermore, (33) yields (k = 1, . . . , K).
Combining the first of these relations with (39) and (35), we obtain (41) γ 1 − α 1 + 2δ 2 q 1 = 0.
Similarly, the corresponding second relations in (38) and (40) allow to derive that (42) γ 2 − α 2 + 2δ 1 q 2 = 0.
Finally, reading the components of (32) with the concrete shape of B gives (43)q
Adding both equations leads to (44)q
Summation over k entails that q 1 + q 2 = d 1 + d 2 . Now, this last equation along with (37), (41) and (42) constitutes a system of four linear equations in the four unknowns α 1 , α 2 , q 1 and q 2 , which is easily solved, yielding the solution
,
.
With these α 1 and α 2 one may combine (44) and (36) in order to identify the scenariodependent amounts of electricity generation of both competitors:
2(δ 1 + δ 2 ) (k = 1, . . . , K).
Next, using either of the two equations in (43), we may resolve for the scenariodependent amount of electricity sent from node 2 to node 1:
The expected value of this flow calculates as
Finally, we determine the expected profits π i of both competing generators:
